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HAVENS REALTY CORP. V COLEMAN:
EXTENDING STANDING IN RACIAL
STEERING CASES TO HOUSING
ASSOCIATIONS AND TESTERS
TERESA L. McRAE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (FHA) under Title
VIII' in response to concern over discriminatory practices in the
housing market.2 Aiming to produce "truly integrated and balanced
living patterns",3 the Act prohibited a refusal to sell, rent, negotiate,
or "otherwise make unavailable" housing on the grounds of "race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."4 Since enactment, many ven-
* B.A., Emory University, 1979; J.D., Washington University, 1982.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-3619 (1976).
2. Congress has definitively stated its policy objective in passing the Fair Housing
Act: "(I)t is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limita-
tions, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
Senator Mondale alluded to the purpose of Title VIII when he introduced the fair
housing legislation, amendment 524 to H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), subse-
quently part of Title VIII: "(F)air housing legislation is a basic keystone to any solu-
tion of our present urban crisis. . . .Declining tax base, poor sanitation, loss of jobs,
inadequate educational opportunities, and urban squalor will persist as long as dis-
crimination forces millions to live in the rotting core of central cities." 114 CONG.
Rnc. 2274 (1968).
In response to Senator Brooke's expression of hope for integration, Senator Mans-
field stated that Title VIII would provide everyone in this country, "the opportunity
to freely choose the house which he desires." 114 CONG. REc. at 2283, 2525.
3. 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) (statement by Senator Mondale).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976).
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dors of housing have attempted to avoid the FHA prohibitions by
engaging in subtle methods of perpetuating housing discrimination.5
5. In addition to racial steering, defined at note 6 and accompanying text, infra,
there exist several other methods of housing discrimination such as: exclusionary
zoning, blockbusting, and restrictive covenants.
Exclusionary zoning labels the effects of a municipality's zoning ordinance falling
disproportionately upon a certain class (or classes) of persons, usually the lower-in-
come groups or members of minorities. This is not generally a result of direct quotas.
Population stagnation is a consequence of limiting property development or timing
such development so as to prevent growth. D. MOSKOWITz, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
LITIGATION 18 (1977). See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
808 (1975) (held a developing municipality may not by a system of land use regula-
tion make it physically and economically impossible to provide low- and moderate-
income housing in the municipality for different categories of people who need and
desire it); Surrick v. Zoning Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977) (ordinance invali-
dated that excluded multifamily dwellings by having a one-acre minimum in a resi-
dential district); Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341
A.2d 466 (1975) (zoning ordinance that provided for apartment construction in only
80 of 11,589 acres in the township was unconstitutionally exclusionary).
Blockbusting is one means of inducing complete racial turnover in a neighborhood
by high-pitched broker activity centered around excessive solicitation of sales at
greatly lowered prices. Note, Legal Control of Blockbusting, 1972 URBAN L. ANN.
145 (1972). See United States v. Bob Laurence Realty, Inc. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973), reh'g denied 414 U.S. 1087 (upheld anti-blockbust-
ing provision of FHA and reached illegal group activities even if individual members
did not engage in the practice or pattern); Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp.
1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (statements of a real estate company to white property owners
that a neighborhood was "going colored" violated § 804(a)); but see United States v.
Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tenn.), a.fd, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975) (an agent's
telling home buyers on three occasions "the coloreds are moving in" and he "wasn't
showing anything in that area except to colored people" did not constitute a violation
of § 804(e)).
Restrictive covenants are agreements or promises by two or more individuals, in
writing in a deed, to restrict the use of property in some manner. These limitations
permit landowners to set up conditions for development of the land. See generally
MacEllven, Land Use Control Through Covenants, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 310 (1962). See
Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980) (the court held a "residen-
tial purposes only" covenant did not exclude a run-for-profit group home for men-
tally retarded adults); Starmount Co. v. Greensboro Memorial Park, Inc., 233 N.C.
613, 65 S.E.2d 134 (1951) (restrictions limiting use of property to residential purposes
and single-family dwellings, and prohibiting commercial uses other than truck gar-
dening and poultry raising for 22 years were reasonable); Clifton v. Puente, 218
S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (state court's refusal to hold for purchasers of Mexi-
can descent in his action for land where covenant prohibited sale of property to per-
sons of Mexican descent would amount to a violation of equal protection).
Redlining is a form of discrimination concerning financial policies of a lending
institution in granting mortgages or loans. When this practice excludes certain com-
munities due to racial factors, it constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976).
See Dunn v. Midwestern Indem., Etc., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (a failure
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Racial steeringO-a tactic by which a realtor "steers" a prospective
buyer or rentor to accommodations in areas primarily inhabited by
members of the buyer or rentor's racial or ethnic group-is a major
method of preserving segregated housing.7
Typical victims of racial steering seldom have the ability, expertise,
or resources to prove a racial steering violation.8 Consequently, en-
forcement of the FHA prohibition against racial steering often occurs
through actions instigated by testers and housing associations.' Test-
ers pose as homeseekers in order to determine whether a particular
realtor will engage in unlawful steering practices.' 0 A group of test-
ers is uniquely able to penetrate the realtor's subterfuge and make the
difficult factual showing of discriminatory intent.1 ' Housing associa-
or refusal to provide property insurance on dwellings based on racial composition of
the neighborhood violated FHA); Laughman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 408 F.
Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (violation of FHA where race was a consideration in the
denial of a loan). See also Baptiste, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U.
L. REv. 989 (1976).
6. The practice of racial steering generally evolves from a real estate agent's judg-
ment that the customer is "either incompatible or unacceptable to the residents of a
housing area due to his race, religion or national origin, or that the residents of an
area will be unacceptable to that buyer due to racial, religious or ethnic differences."
See Note, Real Estate Steering and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 12 TULSA L.J. 760
(1977) (hereinafter cited as Real Estate Steering).
One explanation for the agent or broker's decision to steer is the real estate indus-
try's belief that property values drop when minorities begin to settle in white commu-
nities. Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Brokers and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J.
808, 809 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Racial Steering).
7. See Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (conduct which may
not result in a refusal to deal may still constitute illegal steering, and it is irrelevant
whether the realtor or witness initiated a discussion of race); but see Tomlinson
Agency v. Pennsylvania, I1 Pa. Commw. 277, 312 A.2d 118 (1973) (omission of a
home's availability without more evidence did not result in a violation where it could
be caused by distraction or absentmindedness). See also Racial Steering, supra, note
6, at 809-12.
8. Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 1978)
(racial steering is difficult to prove other than by comparing the neighborhoods
homeseekers are directed to.).
9. Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); see Coles v. Havens Re-
alty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980), afd in part, sub. nom. Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 50 U.S.L.W. 4232 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (No. 80-988). Sherman Park
Community Assoc. v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
10. For a general discussion of the roles testers play and the important functions
they serve as witnesses, see United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643,
647 n.3, 650, (N.D. Cal. 1973), modofedon other grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1974).
11. 569 F.2d at 1016.
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tions formed to promote fair housing often finance and coordinate
racial steering investigations and litigation. 2 Despite their useful-
ness in FHA litigation, testers and housing associations have found
the threshold issue of standing to sue to be a major barrier to their
direct participation in a racial steering case. 3
Courts have characterized testers as falling within the broader cate-
gory of "private attorneys general"-persons seeking to further an
interest or redress an injury common to a broad class of persons.' 4
Private attorneys general and testers have difficulty meeting the con-
stitutional and prudential prerequisites to standing to sue because
their injuries are not purely private or personal.' Housing associa-
tions have also had difficulty showing a sufficient injury to meet
standing requirements.' 6 After briefly discussing racial steering17
and general standing concepts,' 8 this Note discusses the evolution of
standing under the FHA.19 Specifically, this Note examines the
Supreme Court's recent expansion of standing to include testers and
housing associations.
II. RACIAL STEERING UNDER TITLE VIII
Plaintiffs allegedly victimized by racial steering encounter both
substantive and procedural barriers in seeking judicial relief. Section
80420 of the Fair Housing Act defines the substantive prerequisites
for proving that realtor conduct is unlawfully discriminatory. Section
804(a) establishes a broad proscription against those who would
12. See Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980) (Housing
association investigated allegations of discrimination, referred complaints to authori-
ties, and took steps to eliminate discriminatory housing practices).
13. See TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273, (a community volunteer organi-
zation was denied standing to challenge alleged steering practices) (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
14. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). (As HUD
has no enforcement powers and assuring fair housing is a large task, plaintiff's act as
private attorneys general to further an important congressional policy).
15. TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S.
859 (1976). Plaintiffs who did not make bonafide efforts to seek housing were not
direct victims, of an alleged steering.
16. 569 F.2d at 1017.
17. See notes 20-43 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 44-93 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 94-222 and accompanying text infra.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976).
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"otherwise make unavailable" housing on a discriminatory basis.21
Subsequent sections specifically prohibit discriminatory advertis-
ing,22 false statements regarding availability of housing,23 and dis-
crimination in providing general services connected with the sale or
lease of a dwelling.24
The practice of racial steering does not fall neatly within any of the
FHA proscriptions. The difficulty in utilizing the Act to combat ra-
cial steering results from the fine, conceptual line between the real
estate agent who merely provides information to the prospective buy-
ers, and the agent who intentionally directs them into "homogene-
ous" communities.25 In determining on which side of the line the
activities of a particular agent fall, courts make a factual, case by case
inquiry into whether the realtor's actions are racially motivated.26
For example, an agent may describe neighborhoods as "uncomforta-
ble" or "changing", "good" or "nice" to steer prospective buyers
away from or into that area.27 A court must determine whether use
21. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1976). § 804(c) makes it illegal "to make, print or pub-
lish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement or advertise-
ment, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, or an
intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination." Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976). This section makes it unlawful "to represent to
any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin that any dwelling is not
available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available." Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1976). This provision makes it a violation "to discrimi-
nate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because
of race, color, religion, or national origin." Id.
25. In the blockbusting context, see, e.g., United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352
(E.D. Tenn. 1974) afrd 516 F.2d 902 (1975). However, some statements by real estate
agents regarding a decline of certain neighborhoods may be protected as free speech.
See Dekalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman and Bd. of Comm'rs, 372 F. Supp. 748,
755 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
26. The defendant has the burden of showing race was not a main consideration
in the steering. See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974)
(humiliation inferred from racial motivation in awarding damages); Haythe v. Decker
Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972) (racial motivation not disregarded just be-
cause it was not the only or total factor of discrimination).
27. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (it is not necessary
to show steering a prospective buyer was on a racial basis in that the "steered" areas
were all white). Relating code words to discriminatory intent arguably impinges
upon First Amendment rights of the agent. However, the First Amendment has some
limitations, such as commercial speech or making remarks to further housing discrim-
ination. Perhaps the less benign the motive the less the First Amendment protection.
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
of such code words manifests an unlawful discriminatory intent, or
whether such comments are lawful comments concerning racial com-
position that are accurate and not intended to foster racial bias.2"
In order for victims of racial steering to surmount these substantive
hurdles, they must meet certain procedural requirements. The Fair
Housing Act provides three alternative enforcement mechanisms.2 9
Section 813 authorizes the Attorney General to redress wrongs result-
ing from any discriminatory practice that "raise[s] an issue of public
importance."3 Section 810"' allows enforcement suits by a private
party claiming past or potential "irrevocably injur[y] by a discrimina-
tory housing practice that is about to occur."32 Such a party is a
"person aggrieved" for purposes of standing under the section. 33 The
private plaintiff may file a complaint with the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) within 180 days of the alleged dis-
crimination.34 The Secretary has the authority to use informal meas-
ures to settle meritorious disputes.35 If remedies under state or local
law appear substantially equivalent to the Title VIII remedy,36 a
See United States v. Bob Laurence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Fair Housing Act reaches commercial speech made to reap profits from racial
representation).
28. In the analogous blockbusting situation, see Quinlan and Tyson, Inc. v. City
of Evanston, 25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 324 N.E.2d 65 (1975); Abel v. Lomenzo, 18 N.Y. 2d
619, 219 N.E.2d 289, 272 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Ct. N.Y. 1966) (advising prospective
buyers as to racial make-up of different areas not prohibited since the information
was accurate and not meant to encourage racial prejudice).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612, 3613 (1976).
30. 42 U.S.C. 3613 (1976). The Attorney General, in filing a complaint may also
include a request for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
preventive relief against those engaged in the discriminatory practice. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (Sec-
tion 810's "person aggrieved" has a broad meaning, as it is defined as "(a)ny person
who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice"). For a more
in depth discussion of Trafficante, see notes 96-104 and accompanying text infra.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1976).
35. 42 U.S.C. 3610(a) (1976). The Secretary has the power to resolve a complaint
by informal means of conference, conciliation and persuasion. Id See, e.g., Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (as HUD failed to obtain
voluntary compliance within the statutory period, plaintiffs brought suit in District
Court under § 810(d) of the Act).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1976). At present there are 22 states HUD considers
having substantially the same remedies it does: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, In-
diana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
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plaintiff suing under Section 810 must instead pursue those avenues
of relief.37 In the absence of a comparable state or local remedy, Sec-
tion 810 expressly creates a private cause of action under the Act.
3 8
Section 81231 provides a third enforcement scheme that allows a
victim of housing discrimination to bring an action in federal district
court without delay.' Section 812 does not include the "person ag-
grieved" requirement set out in Section 810.4' This omission raises
the question of whether or not indirectly injured persons may sue
under Section 812.42 Since Section 812 lacks the "person aggrieved"
standing limitation, the provision arguably extends standing to a
class of persons beyond those protected by Section 810.4" Thus, a
potential private plaintiff must be a "person aggrieved" before he has
standing under § 810 and, perhaps, § 812 to request redress for any
injury suffered or threatened.
III. GENERAL CONCEPTS ABOUT STANDING
Federal standing law is rooted in the "case or controversy" re-
quirement of Article III of the United States Constitution," and cer-
tain prudential limitations developed by the federal judiciary to
restrict its authority to hear and decide cases.4" For a claim to meet
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Also included is the
District of Columbia, 24 C.F.R. § 115.11 (1979).
37. 42 U.S.C. 3610(c) (1976). If a state or local fair housing law has remedial
provisions comparable substantially to those in the Fair Housing Act, the Secretary
must refrain from further action after notifying that state or local agency of the com-
plaint as long as that agency acts with reasonable promptness. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. 3610(d) (1976). If the Secretary is unable to resolve the dispute
within the 30-day period in subsection (c), the person aggrieved has the right to bring
suit within another 30 days in the United States District Court. 1d.
39. 42 U.S.C. 3612(a) (1976). This section requires that the action be filed within
180 days after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred. Id.
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976).
42. See Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). The controversy
received early attention in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. at 208, and
continued in Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 103 (the absence of "per-
son aggrieved" in § 812 does not indicate standing is more restricted under that sec-
tion than under § 810).
43. 441 U.S. at 103 n.9.
44. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
45. According to these prudential limitations: 1) claimants may not assert rights
1981]
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the Article III requirement, the plaintiff must show that a "case or
controversy" exists between himself and the defendant. 6 The
threshold standing question is whether or not the plaintiff has as-
serted such a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" as
will justify the Court's intervention.47
Recent courts have used the two-part test established by the
Supreme Court in Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp.4s First, to determine both the constitutional and prudential
standing requirements, a plaintiff must allege that he incurred an "in-
jury in fact" as a result of the challenged practice.49 This showing
satisfies the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement.5 0 Sec-
ondly, the plaintiff must assert an interest that arguably falls within
of third parties (except in special situations); 2) plaintiffs interest must fall within the
zone of interests protectable by the statute involved; and 3) a party generally must
allege an injury to himself, not one society shares with him. See, e.g., Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). See also notes 105-110 and accompanying text infra.
46. U.S. CONsT. Art. III, § 2. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1976)
(petitioner's suit for back salary as a member of the House of Representatives for
barring his seating in the 90th Congress was a "case" within Article III after he be-
came seated in the 91st Congress); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227
(1937) (where insurer denied total and permanent disability existed under a policy
which lapsed because premiums were not paid and the holder of the policy claimed
the disability entitled him to cash benefits anyway, an "actual controversy" existed to
allow the suit to be brought); Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. American Anode, 137
F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 1943) (where defendant used patents as an "economic weapon"
against other alleged infringers to include similar methods practiced commercially by
plaintiff, an "actual controversy" existed to determine patent validity even though
defendant did not know until the suit was filed that plaintiff practiced the process
commercially). Butsee Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975) (respondent's transfer
without a hearing from a medium to a maximum security prison because of inmate
conflicts over a prisoners' "union" was not a "case or controversy" as there was no
reasonable expectation now that the wrong would be repeated); United States v.
Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920) (there was no "controversy" in a suit in which
the Interstate Commerce Commission was temporarily prevented from requiring
water carriers to use certain bills of lading as the Commission lacked the power to
prescribe them due to legislation passed pending an interlocutory appeal requiring
changes in the bills).
47. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (plaintiffs allegedly qualified to vote,
as residents of Tennessee counties, for members of the General Assembly for his
county sued on their own behalf and those of all qualified voters similarly situated in
Tennessee to challenge a 1901 statute's apportionment plan of seats in the Assembly
as arbitrary and capricious).
48. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See notes 77-83 and accompanying text infra.
49. Id. at 152-53.
50. Id. at 152.
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the "zone of interests" protected by the Constitution or statute.5
This additional requirement represents judicial self-restraint.52
A. Injury in Fact
The injury in fact component of the two-part test characterizes the
type of injury plaintiff must incur in order to satisfy the case or con-
troversy requirement. First, absent a congressional declaration that
injury in fact is met," a plaintiff must allege an actual or threatened,
rather than speculative, harm.54 The plaintiff must assert a "personal
stake" in the outcome or a "distinct and palpable injury to himself."5
Thus, traditional standing law requires an allegation of a personal
constitutional or statutory harm rather than that of a third party.56
Courts have extended the traditional personal stake requirement
by allowing an interest group or association57 to meet the injury in
fact element where the group makes allegations sufficient to establish
that its members individually possess personal stakes in the result of
the litigation.58 Utilizing this representational standing test, the
51. Id. at 153.
52. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
53. See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.)
(Frank, J.) Yacatedas moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (although Congress cannot authorize
a suit absent an actual justiciable controversy, Congress may authorize the Attorney
General or another official to bring suit to enforce a statutory obligation, and in like
fashion, Congress can authorize private persons to bring such suits). The reach of
Associated Industries may be limited by recent Supreme Court decisions. See Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 50
U.S.L.W. 4103 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (denying taxpayer standing predicated on the es-
tablishment clause to challenge the transfer of surplus government property to a reli-
gious institution). In Valley Forge, the Court appears to distinguish constitutional
injury-in-fact, which Congress cannot alter, from prudential injury-in-fact and other
prudential requirements which Congress can abolish or alter. Id. at 4105-06. Cf. id.
at 4110-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). The Court acknowledged
the alterations in the doctrine of standing over the last decade, and that the
"threatened or actual" harm requirements remained unchanged. Id. City of Rohnert
Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1979) (city seeking to enjoin its urban renewal
agency and a developer from building a regional shopping center because it allegedly
violated antitrust and housing laws had only a speculative interest and no proximate
threat from any violations).
55. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 499.
57. Id. at 510-511.
58. Id. at 511.
19811
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Supreme Court granted standing to an association in Hunt v. Wash-
ing/on Apple Advertising Commission59 even though the association
itself suffered no injury.6" The Court found the association's mem-
bers suffered injury in fact, and the interests sought to be protected by
the litigation related to the organization's purposes. 6' Based on these
findings the Court concluded neither the claim nor the requested re-
lief necessitated participation by individual members in the suit.
62
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to grant an association
standing where the association predicates its standing claim solely on
its asserted representation of broader public interests. In Sierra Club
v. Morton,63 the Court denied the plaintiff-organization standing to
bring suit challenging an administrative order allowing commercial
development of a national forest and game refuge.' The Sierra Club
alleged no direct harm to itself or its members but claimed standing
as a representative of environmentally concerned persons. 65  The
Court required the organization to allege injury to its members,
rather than the public at large.66
Crucial to carrying the injury in fact burden, an individual plaintiff
or an association must demonstrate a causal connection between the
challenged unlawful activity and the alleged personal harm.67 The
present statement of the causation standard, established in Warth v.
59. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Plaintiffs in Hunt challenged a North Carolina statute
that required all apples sold or shipped into North Carolina in closed containers only
be marked with the dppropriate federal grade or identified they are not graded.
Claimants consisted of a statutory agency for promoting the apple industry in Wash-
ington state, including 13 state growers/dealers chosen by their peers, all of whom
were required to finance the agency's operations. Id. at 337.
60. See NAACP v. Alabama, ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (The
probability that the Association itself may suffer an injury in fact if financial support
and membership so that an association has standing on its own).
61. 432 U.S. at 342.
62. Id.
63. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
64. Id. at 741.
65. Id. at 730. The plaintiff sued with "a special interest in the conservation and
the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the coun-
try." Id.
66. Id. at 735. The court stated that only those who use the park and will have the
recreational and aesthetic values decline as a result of the development would be
directly injured.
67. 422 U.S. at 508.
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Seldin ,68 and since modified,6 9 requires the plaintiff to show that "but
for" the alleged unlawful act of the defendant, there exists a "sub-
stantial probability" that the plaintiff would not suffer the claimed
injury.70
The causation requirement presents a difficult barrier to litigants
suing as private attorneys general.7 The Supreme Court, however,
has proven willing to grant standing on rather attenuated chains of
causation. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP),72 the Court found an injury in fact to
SCRAP's members and allowed them to challenge an agency order
imposing a surcharge on railroad freight rates. The organization
claimed the higher rates would increase the use of nonrecyclable
commodities, and the production of these commodities would result
in consumption of more natural resources. 73 Some of these resources
might be extracted from the geographic area in which SCRAP's
members live, and therefore impair their enjoyment of the out-
doors.' In addition, SCRAP alleged that the increased use of nonre-
cyclable goods would result in persons discarding more refuse in the
national parks enjoyed by SCRAP members." Despite the rather
strained causal connection in SCRAP, a plaintiff faces greater diffi-
culty establishing a causal link whenever the alleged injury is more
public than personal.76
In summary, individuals seeking to bring suit must allege a distinct
and personal injury. Associations generally have standing only as
representatives of their members, who would have standing had they
sued individually. The association cannot establish standing by de-
siring to vindicate an injury to members of the public in general. Re-
gardless of whether the suit is brought by individuals or associations
in their representative capacity, the litigants must present a causal
link between the asserted unlawful action and the claimed injury.
68. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
69. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59 (1978).
70. 422 U.S. at 504.
71. Id. at 505.
72. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
73. Id. at 675-676.
74. Id. at 687.
75. Id. at 676.
76. Id. at 685.
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B. Zone of Interests
Under the zone of interests component of the Data Processing test,
the plaintiff must show that the interest that he seeks to vindicate is at
least arguably protected by the Constitution or statute.77 Data
Processing and Barlow v. Collins,7s illustrate the "arguably pro-
tected" standard. In Data Processing, plaintiff-vendors of data
processing services to businesses challenged a ruling by the Comp-
troller of the Currency allowing national banks to make data process-
ing services available to their corporate customers and other banks.79
Plaintiffs alleged that the ruling arguably violated the Banking Acts8
which limits the services that national banks may provide.8 Plain-
tiffs further alleged that Congress intended the Act, in part, to protect
those businesses that would suffer competitive harm if banks per-
formed services beyond narrow banking functions.8 2 The Supreme
Court held that vendors of data processing services arguably fell
within the zone of interests protected by the Act.8 3
In Barow, the companion case to Data Processing, the Supreme
Court granted standing to plaintiffs arguably protected by federal
statute.84 Tenant farmers eligible to receive cash subsidy payments
under the Upland Cotton Program 5 sought to challenge agency reg-
ulations allowing tenant farmers to assign future profits to their land-
lords for a payment of rent.8 6 Plaintiffs alleged that Congress, in
establishing the subsidy program, intended to benefit tenant farmers,
and that the regulations would frustrate this purpose by allowing
landlords to force the tenants to assign Program benefits to the land-
lords as a prerequisite to obtaining leases to work the land.87 The
77. 397 U.S. at 153.
78. 397 U.S. 159 (1969).
79. 397 U.S. 151 (1969).
80. Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. § 1864.
81. 397 U.S. at 155.
82. 397 U.S. at 152.
83. Id. at 156.
84. 397 U.S. at 167.
85. The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to pay a farmer in advance of the
growing season up to 50% of the estimated benefits due him. The Secretary held the
authority to make such payments in 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(5) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). 397
U.S. at 160 n.1.
86. 397 U.S. at 162.
87. Id. at 163.
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Court concluded that the legislative history of the relevant statutory
provisions clearly placed the tenant farmers within the zone of inter-
ests protected by the Act.8" As Barlow and Data Processing demon-
strate, courts willingly recognize a broad class of people who may
challenge administrative action. 9 Apart from economic injuries, the
zone of interest may include "aesthetic, conservational, and recrea-
tional values."" For example, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence Y. FPC,91 the Second Circuit held that a conservationist
association had exhibited such a special interest in the aesthetic, con-
servational, and recreational aspects of power development to be an
"aggrieved party" under the Federal Power Act.92 Judicial inclina-
tion to construe broadly the "zone of interest" reflects judicial senti-
ment in favor of relaxing standing requirements if "private attorneys
general" can further vital public policies.93 This relaxed standing
doctrine extends to plaintiffs under the Fair Housing Act.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STANDING UNDER FAIR
HOUSING CASES
The class of fair housing plaintiffs with standing to sue has ex-
panded in recent years, both in terms of the plaintiff's identity and
the nature of the injury alleged.9" The pre-Bellwood decisions in-
volving general fair housing claims reflect the liberalization of stand-
ing requirements and provide the foundations for the post-Bellwood
racial steering cases granting standing under the FHA to fair housing
88. Id. at 164.
89. Id. at 165.
90. Courts have also recognized the validity of aesthetic considerations in zoning
restrictions, where it serves a public interest and is formulated rationally. For a dis-
cussion of these decisions, see Note, Aesthetic Zoning, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 295, 303
(1976).
91. 354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
92. Id. at 616.
93. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393, 215 U.S. 544, 556 (1969) (The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 has a broad enough purpose to grant the individual citizen stand-
ing to insure his city or county government complies with the Act's approval require-
ments); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (A plaintiff
seeking an injunction under Title II of the Civil Rights Act does so for himself and as
a "private attorney general" indicating a policy of the highest congressional priority).
94. Plaintiff's identity refers to the scope of the class of potential litigants. The
nature of the harm characterizes a distinction in degree rather than kind. See notes135-222 and accompanying text ifra. For a thorough discussion of this development,
see SCHWEMON, Standing to Sue in Fair Housing Cases, 41 OHIO S.L.J. 3 (1980).
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associations and testers.95
The first standing case to reach the Supreme Court under the Fair
Housing Act was Trafficante v. Metropolitan LPfe Ins.9 6 Two tenants
of an apartment complex, one black and the other white, filed sepa-
rate complaints alleging that the apartment complex owner had dis-
criminated against non-white rental applicants.97 Plaintiffs alleged
an injury in fact consisting of lost social benefits of living in an inte-
grated environment, missed professional advantages from residing
with minority groups, and embarrassment and economic harm, so-
dally and professionally, in being labelled "white ghetto" residents. 98
The Court held plaintiffs had standing to bring suit under Section
80499 of the FHA, even though lost benefits of living in an integrated
community constituted an indirect injury.'0
The Court found the plaintiffs easily fell within the "broad and
inclusive" language of the Act.' 01 In granting standing the Court em-
phasized that refusal to allow private attorneys general to seek en-
forcement would frustrate congressional intent to halt discriminatory
housing practices.'0 2 The Court noted that suits by the Attorney
General to vindicate the FHA are limited by shortage of staffing and
the authority to sue only if there is "a pattern or practice" of housing
discrimination."0 3 This led the Court to conclude Congress intended
to grant standing as broadly as the Constitution allows, thus minimiz-
ing zone of interest inquiry."°4
In Warth v. Seldin,0 5 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
standing as it applied to persons seeking to challenge alleged racially
motivated exclusionary zoning in an area in which they did not re-
95. See notes 156-222 and accompanying text infra.
96. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
97. Id. at 206-07.
98. Id. at 208.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976).
100. Id. at 209-210.
101. Id. at 209.
102. 409 U.S. at 211.
103. Id. at 108. Trafficante emphasized the limited staff of the Housing Section of
the Civil Rights Division who acts for the Attorney General, The court further stated
HUD's lack of enforcement powers and the momentous job of overseeing fair housing
minimizes the Attorney General's role, the primary enforcement mechanism must be
private suits.
104. Id. at 209.
105. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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side." The individual plaintiffs-low income and minority resi-
dents of the Rochester, New York area-alleged that the zoning
ordinance in suburban Penfield in violation of the Constitution and
the Civil Rights Act of 1968,107 precluded the construction of low-
and moderate-income housing in Penfield.10 In finding the individ-
ual plaintiffs did not have standing, the Court held that petitioners
present a successful standing claim when they allege facts from which
a court could reasonably infer that absent the restrictive zoning plan,
the individual plaintiffs would be able to lease or purchase in
Penfield."°  The Court found the present complaint defective be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of a specific
planned housing project in which the plaintiffs could reside if the
court struck down the ordinance." 0
Having rejected the standing claim of the individual plaintiffs in
Warth,"' the Court denied standing' 12 to Metro-Act' 1 ---an organi-
106. Id. at 494-95 (setting out the demographic characteristics of the individualplaintiffis).
107. Id. at 493. The plaintiffs alleged the Penfield ordinance violated their First,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and those civil rights protected under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Id.
108. Plaintiffs alleged the Penfield ordinance allocated 98% of the town's avail-
able land to single-family use and reserved only 0.3% of the available land to multi-
family use. As to the single-family zoning, regulations on lot size, setback, floor area,
and habitable space, increased the cost of single-family housing beyond the reach of
low- and moderate-income persons. As to the available multi-family uses, low den-
sity and other requirements rendered multi-family developments too costly for low-
and moderate-income residents. Plaintiffs also alleged Penfield's zoning authorities
acted improperly when developers presented them with proposals for low- and mod-
erate-income housing. 422 U.S. at 495.
109. Id. at 504 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
110. Id. at 504-508. The Court stated that despite claims by the individual plain-
tiffs that they had attempted and failed to find adequate low- and moderate-income
housing in Penfield, plaintiffs failed to show that their inability to locate housing di-
rectly resulted from the alleged violations of the defendants. Id. at 504. The Court
emphasized that plaintiffs' injuries can be remedied only if developers come forward
with suitable projects. The Court found no indication that planned developments
submitted to and rejected by Penfield's zoning authorities in the past, would be af-
fordable to persons at the plaintiffs' income levels. Id. at 505-07.
111. Two years later, in Village of/Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corporation (MHDC), 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Supreme Court granted
standing to individual, non-resident plaintiffs to challenge a zoning ordinance which
excluded low-income housing from the village. Unlike Warth, the plaintiffs presented
the Court with a specific plan for construction of a housing project. The Court held
that there existed a substantial probability that the project would be realized if the
Court struck down the exclusionary ordinance. Id. at 264.
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zation of low- and moderate-income persons residing in the Roches-
ter area, some of whom resided within Penfield. Metro-Act claimed
standing as a Rochester taxpayer and as a representative of its mem-
bers, also Rochester taxpayers.1 4 The organization alleged that al-
though the ordinance did not result in the exclusion of its members
from Penfield," 5 the ordinance operated to exclude other low- and
moderate-income persons and thereby deprive Metro-Act members
of association with the excluded persons." 6 In rejecting this claim,
the Court distinguished Trafficante, holding that the Civil Rights Act,
unlike the FHA, does not define the alleged deprivation of associa-
tion as a sufficient injury to merit standing. "7
Applying the law developed by the Supreme Court in Traf-
ficante118 and Warth, I the Ninth Circuit in Topic v. Circle Realty 2 °
denied standing to testers seeking to enforce the FHA. In Topic,
plaintiffs, members of an organization devoted to eliminating racial
discrimination in the housing market, 121 posed as homeseekers in or-
der to investigate suspected perpetrators of racial steering.122 In their
112. In addition to the individual plaintiffs, the Court denied standing to Roches-
ter Home Builders Association, Inc., an association of residential developers in the
Rochester metropolitan area. Home Builders sought to intervene, claiming that the
alleged unlawful activities of defendants injured its member-developers. The Court
held that for damage relief for past injury the individual injured members and not the
association are the appropriate parties. Id. at 515-16. As to prospective relief, the
association lacks standing because it failed to allege that any member had applied for
a building permit or variance for a current project. Absent such a showing the associ-
ation lacked representational standing to seek prospective relief for its members. Id.
at 516.
113. Metro-Act was a nonprofit corporation organized for the following purpose:
To alert ordinary citizens to problems of social concern; . . . to inquire into
the reasons for the critical housing shortage for low- and moderate-income per-
sons in the Rochester area and to urge action on the part of citizens to alleviate
the general housing shortage for low- and moderate-income persons.
422 U.S. at 494.
-114. Id. at 512.
115. Id.
116. Id. Metro-Act in so alleging relied on the standing justification accepted in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See discussion of Taf-
ficante, notes 96-104 and accompanying text supra.
117. Id. at 513.
118. See notes 96-104 and accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 105-117 and accompanying text .supra.
120. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 1274.
122. Id.
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complaint, plaintiffs alleged the same injuries successfully asserted in
Trafficante,123 namely, the deprivation of social, professional, and
economic benefits of living in an integrated community.' 24
In denying standing to housing associations and three individual
members, the court compared the provisions of Sections 812 and 810.
The court emphasized that Section 810 allows access to persons indi-
rectly injured only after complying with administrative prerequi-
sites,125 while Section 812 permits immediate access to the courts.' 26
Implying that plaintiffs prefer immediate access, the court reasoned
that allowing equivalent standing under both sections would negate
the utility of Section 812.127 Therefore, the court held that Congress
intended Section 812 to grant immediate access only to persons who
are the "primary victims" of illegal discrimination. 1
28
The court, however, indicated that even under Section 810, the
plaintiffs still might not be the proper parties to maintain such a
suit. 29 Although recognizing that litigants may assert the interests of
third parties if the litigants meet the constitutional injury in fact re-
quirement, 3 ' the court stated that the plaintiffs in Topic failed to al-
lege facts sufficient to establish injury in fact.'31 The plaintiffs, unlike
the litigants in Trafficante, did not reside within the area of the al-
leged discrimination. Rather, they resided in different parts of the
metropolitan area.' 32  As a result the court found an attenuated
causal connection between the plaintiffs' asserted injury-loss of the
benefits of living in an integrated community-and the defendant's
alleged acts of discrimination.133 Relying on Warth, the court rea-
soned that it could not conclude that "but for" the defendant's acts,
123. See notes 96-104 and accompanying text supra.
124. 532 F.2d at 1274.
125. Id. at 1275-76.
126. Id. The court emphasized that the narrow language of § 812, those who are
deemed to have access to the courts by virtue of the Act are only those who are the
"direct objects" of the practices. Id.
127. Id. at 1276.
128. Id. at 1275.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The court noted that even if defendant had not conducted these discrimi-
natory practices, there still existed the possibility the communities involved would still
be segregated. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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the plaintiffs would reside in integrated communities.134 In other
words, plaintiffs failed to show that a remedy against the defendant
would cure plaintiffs' alleged injury.
In its 1979 decision in Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood,'35 the
Supreme Court partially resolved the uncertainty regarding who has
standing to sue under Section 812. In Bellwood, one black and four
white residents of the Village of Bellwood, a black resident from a
neighboring town, the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open
Communities, 136 and the Village of Bellwood all filed separate suits
under Section 812 against two real estate agencies.' 37 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant real estate agencies steered prospective
black home buyers away from predominantly white areas and toward
integrated neighborhoods in the Village of Bellwood.138 The realtors
also allegedly directed white buyers away from Bellwood. 139 The
realtors responded, contending that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
assert unlawful steering under Section 812.140
Finding that Congress intended to confer Section 812 standing on
the same class of persons covered by Section 810, the Supreme Court
held that at least some of the plaintiffs here possessed standing. 14 1 In
so holding, the Court rejected the distinction in Topic142 between
Sections 810 and 812. Instead the Court drew upon Trafficante and
upon evidence of Congressional intent 143 that Section 810 and 812
134. Id.
135. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
136. The Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities was a non-
profit corporation devoted to elimination of housing discrimination in the Chicago
metropolitan area. 569 F.2d at 1015.
137. Id. at 1015.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 441 U.S. at 102. The court analyzed the language of the two sections, point-
ing out that on its face, § 812 does not have particular statutory limitations. The use
of passive voice in § 812 eliminated the need for a direct reference to a possible claim-
ant. Id.
142. See notes 125-128 and accompanying text supra.
143. The court looked to a House Judiciary Committee Report's use of the words
"aggrieved person" to indicate potential § 812 claimants, in addition to the § 812 rem-
edy as alternate relief to § 810. 114 CONG. REc. 9612 (1968). The court inferred from
this report these two sections were to encompass one class of plaintiffs. 441 U.S. at
107 n.18. For a general legislative history of the Act, see Dubofsky, Fair Housing- A
Legislative History and Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
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provide alternative remedial mechanisms for the same class of plain-
tiffs. ' Thus, some "indirect" victims of housing discrimination are
within the "zone of interests" for standing under Section 812.145
Having dispensed with the need for further inquiry into "zone of
interests," the Court turned to whether the specific plaintiffs met the
Article III "injury in fact" requirement. First, the Court held that the
Village of Bellwood alleged a sufficient injury by claiming that racial
steering resulted in a reduced number of prospective homebuyers and
an exodus of white residents."4 The exodus would depress property
values, thereby threatening the municipality's ability to bear the costs
of local government and to provide services.147
Second, the Court viewed the individual resident-testers as seeking
standing in two independent capacities-as residents and as "test-
ers."'148 Following Trafficante, the Court in Bellwood held that resi-
dents of a neighborhood whose racial composition is affected by
racial steering meet the injury in fact requirement by alleging a depri-
vation of the social advantages of living in an integrated area and an
economic diminution of property values. 149 The Supreme Court de-
clined to constrain the application of Trafficante to a residential area
not larger than an apartment complex by granting individual resi-
dents standing in Bellwood although the area of the alleged harm
spanned 156 square blocks.' The Court concluded that the causal
connection needed between the harm and the act did not follow from
a temporal or spatial relationship with a defendant. 15 1 Causality de-
pends only upon whether a personal injury resulted from the defend-
ant's actions. 152
As the testers did not reargue their claim on appeal, the Supreme
144. 441 U.S. 91, 107-09.
145. The court placed importance on Representative John Conyers' statement in
1966 when this bill was discussed in the House: "Conciliation is easier in an informal
administrative procedure than in the formal judicial process. Also individual court
suits would place a greater burden of expense, time, and effort not only on the plain-
tiff but on all other parties involved, including the seller, broker, and mortgage
financier, and on the judicial system itself." 112 CONG. Rac. 18402 (1966).
146. 441 U.S. at 110.
147. Id. at 110-111.
148. Id. at 111.
149. Id. at 115.
150. 441 U.S. at 113.
151. Id. at 113-114.
152. Id. at 114.
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Court did not consider whether the individuals had standing by vir-
tue of their status as testers.' 53 The Seventh Circuit opinion in Bell-
wood did not distinguish between individual plaintiffs within the
affected area and those outside, and found the individual plaintiffs in
general suffered an injury in fact.' 54 The Seventh Circuit also denied
standing to housing associations.' 55
Two post-Bellwood racial steering cases, however, have held that
fair housing organizations and testers have standing to bring their
own suits under the FHA. 56 In Sherman Park Community Associa-
tion v. Wauwatosa Realty Co.,'5 7 a nonprofit corporation devoted to
promoting integrated housing in Milwaukee and thirty-nine individ-
ual member-testers brought suit against a realtor for alleged steering
practices. 158 The association and twenty-three member-testers resid-
ing in the association's "primary service area" alleged that the realtor
was causing the area to change from an integrated to a predomi-
nantly segregated neighborhood, thereby depriving the resident
153. Id. at 111.
154. 569 F.2d at 1016 (1978). The court acknowledged that racial steering is al-
most impossible to prove without comparing the areas to which homeseekers of differ-
ent races are directed. As the court pointed out to defendants that plaintiff testers
were not alleging a cause of action as testers, as defendants seemed to befieve, the
court offered that the "tester evidence itself creates a fact issue." Id. at 1016. There-
fore, plaintiffs were granted standing expressly only in their capacity as residents of a
"white ghetto" deprived of the social and professional benefits from being in an inte-
grated community. Id.
155. Id. at 1017. The court rejected the association's claim that frustration of its
mission to promote equal opportunity in housing and costs incurred to attack the
steering practices as a sufficient concrete interest for standing. The court commended
the association's housing goals, but found the dollars spent to challenge defendants as
"simply concomitant to its concern about open housing issues, and does not present
independently cognizable injury." Id. at 1017.
For examples of other insufficient concrete injuries, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 39-40 (1975). (insofar as organizations committed to
promoting access of the poor to health services sought standing on their own, they
alleged insufficient injuries to themselves as organizations). Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. at 739-40 (1972) (despite the Club's dedication to protecting "Our Nation's
natural heritage from man's depredations," the organization lacked the required in-
jury in fact for standing as it was merely involved with this issue, without more).
156. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980) aftdinpart,'rev'd
inpart, sub. nom. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 50 U.S.L.W. 4232 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1982) (No. 80-988); Sherman Park Community Association v. Wauwatosa Realty Co.,
486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
157. 486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
158. Id. at 840.
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member-testers of the benefits of living in an integrated neighbor-
hood.159 The association and sixteen member-testers residing in ex-
clusively white areas outside the association's service area alleged
that the steering resulted in "white ghettos" that also deprived the
plaintiffs of the advantages of integration. 6 The defendant-realtor
argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge its activity in
such a broad geographic area as metropolitan Milwaukee. 1 61
In its 1980 opinion, the federal district court rejected the defend-
ant's argument.162 Without distinguishing the association from its
member-testers, the Sherman Park court broadly construed Bellwood
to grant standing to any plaintiff deprived of the benefits of integra-
tion by a realtor's racial steering activity.' 63 Sherman Park emphati-
cally rejected the defendant's contention that Bellwood required an
injury to a small, compact geographic area. 6 Instead, the court held
that a realtor's actions throughout an entire metropolitan area could
sufficiently injure residents of smaller, more distinct neighborhoods
within the metropolitan area.' 65
The court also examined an analogous issue regarding the right of
plaintiffs to bring a class action suit on behalf of all current and po-
tential, black and white, residents and homeseekers in metropolitan
Milwaukee.' 66 Sherman Park found that the plaintiff had standing to
represent all current and potential residents of the metropolitan area
desiring to live in integrated neighborhoods.'67 The court, however,
refused to grant standing to represent current and potential
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 841. Defendant relied greatly upon the Bellwood passage commenting
on the possibility of a "neighborhood" being so extensive in area or so densely or
sparsely settled that no actual harm to any one resident resulted. 441 U.S. at 114.
162. 486 F. Supp. at 842.
163. Id.
164. Id. The court then responded to defendant's argument that the target area
was too wide to result in a particularized injury by saying to so reason would disre-
gard the "practical realities of the Milwaukee housing market." As defendant oper-
ated throughout the entire metropolitan area, the alleged practices could be felt
throughout that area. Id.
165. Id. The court cautioned that, although these particular plaintiffs perhaps
were without standing to challenge the whole city's housing patterns, they received
standing regarding the patterns in their own neighborhoods. Id.
166. Id. at 843-44.
167. Id. at 844.
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
homebuyers.161 Citing the Seventh Circuit Bellwood opinion, the
court reasoned that homebuyers suffer "... an entirely different in-
jury from. . .[testers]. . .in that their claim for relief depends upon
their status as homebuyers. This difference affects proof of damages,
causation, and liability. Such factors go to the very nature of a
claim. .169
Six months after Sherman Park, the Fourth Circuit used much
broader reasoning to also find that testers and associations have
standing under the FHA to challenge racial steering. In Coles v.
Havens Realty Corporation,170 a housing association (HOME) and its
employee testers individually filed suit against the defendant broker
for alleged racial steering in the rental of apartment units.' 71 The
purpose of HOME, a non-profit organization with approximately 600
members, was to eliminate unlawful discriminatory practices, and
promote equal opportunity in housing in the Richmond Metropolitan
Area. 72 Pursuant to this purpose, HOME operated a housing coun-
seling service, investigated complaints of discrimination, conducted
independent investigations for housing discrimination, and referred
victims of discrimination to appropriate state and federal agencies. 173
In the scope of their employment at HOME, the testers posed as pro-
spective renters interested in vacancies within the county. 74 HOME
and the testers alleged that the defendant realtors unlawfully
"steered" the testers to certain apartment complexes because of their
race.17  In a series of alternative holdings, the Fourth Circuit re-
jected the defendant's contention that the testers and HOME lacked
standing. 176
The court stated that the testers in their capacity as testers had
standing to assert the rights of third parties independent of any per-
sonal harm.177 Co/es analogized the present case with two older civil
rights cases that granted standing to plaintiffs who deliberately al-
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980).
171. Id. at 385.
172. Id.
173. I1d.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 386.
176. Id. at 387-91.
177. Id. at 387.
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lowed themselves to be injured for the sole purpose of initiating liti-
gation.'7I According to Coles, the "binding similarity" of the cases is
that they all deal with the rights of plaintiffs "to challenge actions
frustrating vital public policy where in most instances no other effec-
tive challenge could be mounted."'1 9 After noting this similarity,
however, the court acknowledged that the civil rights plaintiffs actu-
ally incurred a personal injury while the Coles testers asserted the
rights of third persons.8° Coles reasoned an alleged personal injury
was unnecessary since the fraudulent nature of racial steering made
victims actually injured less able than testers acting as private attor-
neys general to bring suit to enforce the "deeply-grounded human
right" of fair housing."8' Therefore, the court concluded that al-
lowing testers standing to assert third party rights independent of per-
sonal injury recognizes the "elasticity necessary to accommodate
constitutional congressional intent."' 82
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit used reasoning similar to Sher-
man Park to find that the testers alleged sufficient injury to meet the
standing requirements as individuals personally harmed.'83 Noting
that Henrico County was the location of the alleged racial steering
and also the residence of the testers, the court found that the testers
suffered the same injuries as did apartment complex residents in Traf-
ficante or the neighborhood residents in Bellwood.'I 4 The size of the
geographic area was not important provided plaintiffs could show
some injury. 8 5 The court also suggested that the false information
itself (as opposed to the resulting discriminatory housing) constituted
an injury to the tester since the Act expressly prohibits such false
representations.'8 6
Coles summarily held that HOME had representational standing
178. Id. at 387, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); (plaintiffs denied ad-
mission to the "whites only" section of the bus station), Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202
(1958) (plaintiffs denied seating in prohibited section of bus).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 388.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 388-89.
184. Id. at 388-89.
185. Id. at 391. The Richmond city limits had a population of 219,883 and sur-
rounding county of 172,922, as compared to 8,200 tenants in the Trafficante apartment
complex and 20,969 in the city of Bellwood, Illinois. Id. at 391 & n.5.
186. Id. at 388.
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under the Washington Apple doctrine to litigate on behalf of its mem-
bers allegedly injured by defendant's conduct.'87 Alternatively, the
court held that HOME had standing to sue in its capacity as an asso-
ciation independent of any injury to its members. i8" HOME met the
"injury in fact" requirement by alleging that the realtor's conduct in-
jured the association itself by frustrating HOME's purpose of further-
ing equal access to housing through referrals.189 In addition, HOME
emphasized the substantial resources it devoted toward detecting and
working against defendant's racial steering practices.' 90 In finding
independent association standing, the court stated that HOME's
goals were "... functional, requiring identifiable action and the ex-
penditure of effort and funds which may result in success or failure in
achieving its objectives." '191
The Supreme Court partially affirmed Coles v. Havens Realy Corp.
in its recent opinion, Havens Realy Corp. v. Coleman.' 92 In a unani-
mous opinion, the Court held that both testers and associations may
have standing under the FHA' 93 In reaching this result, the Court
adopted reasoning that may significantly alter both FHA and general
standing law.
The reasoning used by Coles and Sherman Park to grant standing
to testers illustrates some of the alternative rationales available to the
Court in Havens Realy. First, Sherman Park and Coles both broadly
construed Bellwood and Trafficante to eliminate or minimize any ge-
ographic area limitation on asserting the deprivation of the benefits
of integration as an injury in fact. 194 Secondly, Coles briefly sug-
gested that the FHA made the receipt of false information sufficient
187. Id. at 390.
188. Id.
189. Id. The court viewed the harm as more precise than that asserted in Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (an association interested in park conservation
alleged a skiing development in Sequoia National Forest would adversely affect the
area's aesthetics and ecology), and having the "essential dimension of specificity" by
the non-profit plaintiff in Arlington Heights. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
190. 633 F.2d at 390.
191. Id. at 391. The court stated that although the organization's goals were not
as well defined as "bricks and mortar", they were functional in calling for measurable
action and spending time and money to ensure achievement of its objectives. Id.
192. 50 U.S.L.W. 4232 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (No. 80-988).
193. Id. at 4235, 4236.
194. 633 F.2d at 389; 486 F. Supp. at 842.
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to meet the injury in fact requirement.' 95 Finally, Coles reasoned
that "vital public policies" justified granting testers standing as "pri-
vate attorneys general" to assert the injuries of third parties. 196
Most racial steering cases prior to Havens Realty found that the
plaintiffs met the injury in fact requirement by alleging that they re-
sided in a geographic area deprived of the advantages of integra-
tion.19' All of these cases easily dismissed the defendant's contention
that the alleged geographic area was too large.'98 Havens Realty re-
fused to extend this gradual enlargement of the geographic area by
denying standing to racial steering plaintiffs alleging the lost benefits
of integration for residents of Richmond, Virginia. 199 In so doing,
the Court stated that Bellwood limited the "neighborhood standing"
theory to residents of a "relatively compact area.' '2°° While the
Court did not explicitly define what would constitute a "relatively
compact neighborhood," it did hold that an entire metropolitan area
was too large.2°'
Even though the Court refused to extend standing to the plaintiffs
under a liberalized neighborhood standing theory, it did grant stand-
ing to the testers under a novel theory suggested by the Fourth Cir-
cuit.20 2 Havens Realty held that Section 804(d) establishes an
enforceable right of "any person" to truthful information regarding
the availability of housing.2"3 Consequently, any person who re-
ceives illegal false information suffers an injury in fact that Congress
intended the FHA to prevent. 2' In applying this new standing the-
ory to Havens Realty, the Court found that the black testers directed
away from vacant housing in white areas suffered an injury in fact
based on false information."' The Court refused to grant standing
195. 633 F.2d at 388.
196. 633 F.2d at 389.
197. See notes 135-186 and accompanying text supra.
198. Id.
199. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4236 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (No. 80-988).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4235. See Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1980)
("This prohibition against providing false information creates a concomitant right to
receive correct housing information without regard to race or color").
203. Id. at 4234 at - (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (No. 80-988).
204. Id. at 4235.
205. Id.
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to the white testers since the realtor only used truthful information to
steer the white testers away from integrated neighborhoods." °6 The
Court did, however, eventually find that the statute of limitations
prevented the black testers from proceeding with their cause of action
based on false information given prior to the one hundred and eighty
day period.20 7 Havens Realy characterized the alleged false infor-
mation as a one time injury that started the statute of limitations pe-
riod. Those seeking standing as an injured neighborhood or
association, however, could avoid any statute of limitations problem
under a "continuing violation" theory.20
8
Havens Really ignored the Fourth Circuit's contention that the "vi-
tal public policy"of preventing racial discrimination justified tester
standing to assert third party rights independent of any alleged per-
sonal injury.209 Had the Supreme Court adopted this rationale,
Havens Realy would have allowed plaintiffs to avoid the Constitu-
tional "personal stake" requirement under the guise of defending "vi-
tal public policies."2 0
Havens Really's reliance on the false information theory coupled
with its refusal to extend the neighborhood standing theory suggests a
dramatic shift in the judicial focus in fair housing standing cases. In-
stead of looking just at the continuing effects of racial steering on
residents of a certain geographic area, the Court will now look at the
mere receipt of illegal false information by any "person" regardless
of their residence or the effects of such information. 21 1 This shift in
focus has both positive and negative aspects for potential racial steer-
ing tester plaintiffs. While Havens Realty relieves them of the burden
of proving a detrimental effect in a particular area, it also places a
time constraint upon testers.212 By refusing to hold that mere illegal
false information constitutes a "continuing violation", the Court, for
the first time, forces tester plaintiffs to initiate their case within one
hundred and eighty days of the first false information incident of-
fered as evidence.213
206. Id.
207. Id. at 4237. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
208. Id.
209. See notes 177-82 and accompanying text supra.
210. 633 F.2d at 387.
211. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4235 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (No. 80-988).
212. Id. at 4237.
213. Id.
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Coles found that HOME had standing both as a representative of
its members and independently as an association.214 The plaintiffs
later withdrew the representational standing claim from considera-
tion, thus leaving the Court to only consider the issue of association
standing for injury to the association itself.215 Havens Realty granted
the association standing independent of any alleged injury to its indi-
vidual members.216 The Court found that HOME met the injury in
fact requirement by alleging that the defendant's action frustrated its
ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and mod-
erate-income homeseekers and that the association had incurred
significant expense in furthering this purpose.217 Havens Realty dist-
inguished Sierra Club by reasoning that whereas Sierra Club merely
alleged a "setback to the organization's abstract social interests",
HOME alleged a "concrete and demonstrable injury to the organiza-
tion's activities-with the consequent drain on the organization's re-
sources."2 8 Based upon this distinction, the Court granted standing
to HOME.219
Havens Realty's association standing holding obviously makes it
easier for opponents of racial steering to bring suits against realtors
allegedly engaging in racial steering practices. This holding, how-
ever, has potentially enormous ramifications for general standing
law. Apparently, any association that alleges that a defendant ille-
gally frustrated the association's activities with a consequent financial
expense to the association will have standing independent of its mem-
bers.22° Havens Realy's potential for undercutting Sierra Club is
best illustrated with a hypothetical involving facts similar to Sierra
Club.22' Under Havens Realty would Sierra Club have standing if it
alleged that it counselled its members about the availability of scenic
wilderness and spent significant sums of money to ensure such availa-
bility? If the Court would grant standing, then Havens Realty ap-
pears to seriously undermine Sierra Club. Perhaps, however, future
courts will limit this holding to racial steering cases based upon the
214. 633 F.2d at 390.
215. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4236 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982) (No. 80-988).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See notes 218-219 and accompanying text supra.
221. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
"vital public policy" referred to in Coles.222
CONCLUSION
In summary, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman is a very important
racial steering standing case with potentially enormous significance
for general standing law. At the very least, racial steering tester
plaintiffs will have greater access to the courts. Plaintiffs apparently
still have the option of alleging an injury in fact caused by the depri-
vation of the benefits of integration. Havens Realty, however, limits
this alternative to residents of a "relatively compact neighbor-
hood." 3 While future cases must sharpen this test, presumably a
"relatively compact neighborhood" is at least 156 square blocks but
less than an entire metropolitan area. Racial steering plaintiffs now
have an additional option of merely alleging an illegal misrepresenta-
tion.224 While this eliminates the need to prove the individual's resi-
dence in an affected geographic area, racial steering plaintiffs under
this theory must meet a reinvigorated statute of limitations.
Plaintiff housing associations attacking racial steering have
achieved a far more clear cut victory in Havens Realty. They only
have to allege that a defendant illegally frustrated the association's
purpose with a consequential financial expense to the association to
have standing.22 5 Unlike tester plaintiffs, they need not meet the 180
day statute of limitations. 226 This decision may also potentially open
the courts to suits brought by associations outside the area affected by
racial steering practices. Thus, the holding in Havens Realty helps
fulfill the purpose of the Fair Housing Act to prevent discriminatory
practices in the housing market.
222. See note 196 and accompanying text supra.
223. See note 200 and accompanying text supra.
224. See note 203 and accompanying text supra.
225. See note 217 and accompanying text supra.
226. See note 213 and accompanying text supra.
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